Abstract. We analyse how bicameralism can affect national fiscal policies in a federal country when vertical and horizontal externalities interact. Conditions are provided to show when, at equilibrium, the two chambers agree or disagree on the choice of a national capital tax rate, depending on whether or not the pivotal voter in the two chambers is the same.
INTRODUCTION
When countries have a federal architecture, fiscal policies are determined by the interaction between vertical and horizontal externalities which distort fiscal policies, but in opposite directions.
1 A vertical externality tends to lead to inefficiently high-equilibrium tax rates, whereas a horizontal externality tends to lead to inefficiently low-equilibrium tax rates.
2 However, when we try to understand the interaction between such externalities, the institutional structure of federal countries should be taken into account. Given that today all federal countries have bicameral legislatures, such an institutional feature should be considered when the process of drawing up fiscal policies is analysed in federal countries. 3 With bicameralism, local preferences on taxation and public 1. See, for example Kotsogiannis (2002, 2003) and Grazzini and Petretto (2007) for articles analysing the interplay of such externalities. 2. Because of vertical externality, when different tiers of government tax the same base, neither of them takes into account the revenue loss suffered by the others by the shrinking of the common tax base. On the contrary, because of horizontal externality, when governments at the same level tax a mobile base, each of them strategically decreases the tax rate to attract more tax base within its borders without taking into account the loss suffered by the others in terms of tax base reduction. 3. Tsebelis and Money (1997) report that two minor exceptions are the Federal States of Micronesia and the United Arab Emirates. Overall, about one third of countries in the world have bicameral legislatures whose institutional structures, however, vary widely given the different national histories which have led to bicameralism. The features of bicameralism differ on a number of dimensions, i.e. legislative term of office, turnover, size, electoral rules and institutional powers. For example, the lower house is usually elected directly by a nation's citizens, each voter accorded equal weight. On the contrary, the selection of upper house members can be delegated to citizens either directly or indirectly, and the type of representation may vary, i.e. same rule as the lower house, or territorial rule or some minority ethnic or linguistic representations may be granted.
expenditure are represented twice, i.e. by local governments at a local level, and by a territorially based upper chamber at national level, whereas the whole population preferences are represented only once by a lower chamber, still at national level. As local interests can be specific and distinct from those of the whole population, one interesting question to analyse is how the design of fiscal policies in federal countries is affected by the existence of bicameral legislature creating a system of checks and balances for requests coming from different constituencies. 4 To answer such a question, we propose a simple model describing a federal country with bicameral national legislature where a proportionally represented chamber (House) and a geographically represented chamber (Senate) share the same financial legislative responsibilities. Bicameralism is supposed egalitarian: Each decision on taxation or public expenditure has to be approved by both the House and the Senate to pass, i.e. each chamber has the power of veto. In particular, both chambers have to decide on a national tax rate on perfectly mobile capital income, whereas regional governments have to decide on regional capital tax rates. Regional governments play a non-cooperative game between them, with the government of the federal country acting as a Stackelberg leader with respect to its regional governments (i.e. a sequential game). Our main result shows the conditions under which, at equilibrium, the two chambers agree or disagree on the choice of a national tax rate, depending on whether or not the pivotal voter in the two chambers is the same.
Although bicameralism is common in many countries, few theoretical articles have examined its consequences on shaping fiscal policies. 5 The issue at stake draws on both political science and economics, and it has usually been a distributional one, i.e. a bargaining over the division of public expenditures in bicameral legislatures (Ansolabehere et al., 2003) . To analyse such a point, and coalition formation, in particular, most articles use cooperative game theory models of voting power. 6 A non-cooperative approach is instead used by Diermeier and Myerson (1999) and Ansolabehere et al. (2003) . By using a non-cooperative model of lobbying, the first study analyses how bicameralism affects the internal organization of legislatures, i.e. it examines the incentives to delegate decision rights in a game between chambers. In particular, it shows that bicameralism can encourage a chamber to create internal veto players or supermajority rules. The second study focuses attention on the effects of malapportionment, i.e. the highly unequal representation of the population in bicameral legislatures, on the distribution of public expenditures. While there exists large empirical evidence showing a positive relationship between the share of public expenditures a district receives and its per capita seats in the legislature, 7 this study shows that, in a bicameral legislature, contrary to unicameral settings, unequal representation is not sufficient to 4. 'In the Federalist 51, James Madison suggests that one purpose of dividing the legislature into different chambers is to achieve such separation that makes it more difficult for a collusive faction to control the whole legislature' (Diermeier and Myerson, 1999, p. 1195) . 5. Cutrone and McCarty (2006) and Tsebelis and Money (1997) provide comprehensive surveys on bicameralism, and also references to the empirical literature. 6. See the discussion in Ansolabehere et al. (2003) and the references cited there. 7. See, for example Dragu and Rodden (2011), Hoover and Pecorino (2005) , Lee (2000) and references cited in such articles.
explain the maldistribution of government spending. Other institutional rules, such as supermajority rules or proposal power assigned to the malapportioned chamber, are required to explain such phenomenon. 8 Recently, Grazzini and Petretto (2012) analysed the devolution of power with regard to local public goods and public revenue (via tax-sharing grants) to local governments in a federal country with bicameralism which is not egalitarian. When the House has a legislative responsibility on income taxation while the Senate has a legislative responsibility on intergovernmental grants, they show that the approval or refusal of a devolution reform only depends on the comparison between the marginal utility of a federal public good with respect to a centrally provided local public good. This implies that the greater the distance in terms of preferences between the House and the Senate, the greater the probability that bicameral legislature preserves the status quo.
To the best of our knowledge, the novelty of this study is that it analyses how bicameralism can affect capital taxation in a federal country when both vertical and horizontal externalities interact. Previous analyses of such interaction (e.g. Flochel and Madies, 2002; Grazzini and Petretto, 2007; Janeba and Wilson, 2005; Kotsogiannis, 2002, 2003; Kelders and K€ othenb€ urger, 2010; Wrede, 1996) have not taken into account the possible role played by a constitutional feature such as bicameralism in shaping national fiscal policies.
9
The plan of this article is as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 analyses voting on the regional tax policy by the regional governments, and voting on the national tax policy by the House. Section 4 examines whether the national tax policy chosen by the House is also optimal from the viewpoint of the Senate. Finally, Section 5 discusses our results and Section 6 contains some concluding remarks.
THE MODEL
We study a two-period model with a federal country where there is an odd number of asymmetric regions i, i = 1,. . .,I, each populated by a different number n i of identical individuals. Following Lockwood (2002) , the assumption that citizens are homogeneous within any region makes legislative elections straightforward, and as will be clearer below, it allows us to abstract from the role of strategic voting for delegates to the legislature. 10 At the federal level, we suppose a bicameral national legislature made up of two different chambers, the House and the Senate. The House legislators are the representatives, and the Senate legislators are the senators. As we are only interested in analysing financial legislation, we suppose that for such issues there is egalitarian bicameralism. This corresponds to the case of a closed rule, so that any national fiscal policy must 8. For other articles, see also Cr emer and Palfrey (1999), Kalandrakis (2004) and Muthoo and Shepsle (2008) . 9. For empirical analyses on horizontal and vertical fiscal interaction, see among others, EstellerMor e and Sol e-Oll e (2002) and Karkalakos and Kotsogiannis (2007) for Canada, Devereux et al. (2007) for the US, Br€ ulhart and Jametti (2006) for Switzerland and Revelli (2003) for the UK. 10. See also Grazzini and Petretto (2012) . Instead, for articles on strategic voting, see, among others, Chari et al. (1997) , Harstad (2010) , Lorz and Willmann (2005) and Persson and Tabellini (1992) .
be approved by a majority voting in both chambers. 11 In our simple model, this means that a national decision on tax policy can be taken only if both chambers vote in favour of it. However, we suppose a different order of voting for the two chambers. In this sequential set-up, the Senate cannot make proposals or amendments, but it can only vote in favour of or reject proposals that pass the House.
12
The case of the House and the Senate voting simultaneously is also analysed to show that the sequentiality of the game does not affect our result in the set-up with different pivotal voters in the two chambers.
We assume that the Constitution has already fixed the rules to represent the regions' preferences at national level (Cr emer and Palfrey, 1999) , the rules allocating powers on public goods provision and taxing authority between political units at different levels and, finally, the rules governing the strategic interaction between national and regional units.
We assume that both the House and the Senate delegates from region i must be drawn from the homogeneous population in that region, i.e. each region elects citizen candidates as its delegates at the House and at the Senate.
13 Delegates are assumed to be unable to commit to a particular platform, and thus they are only interested in maximizing their utilities once in office. The Constitution fixes two different rules to elect the representatives and the senators. The House is a proportionally represented chamber which adopts population proportional representation: Each region is represented proportionally according to its population, thus the more populated regions are also more represented. The Senate is instead a geographically represented chamber and adopts unit representation: Each region is appointed the same absolute representation independently of its population.
14 To simplify, we assume that each region is represented by a senator. 15 We also suppose simultaneous elections for delegates at all levels, i.e. regional governments, House and Senate.
Both national and regional governments have the power to levy a per unit tax on capital income, which is taxed according to the source-based principle. Capital is assumed to be perfectly mobile while agents are immobile. Tax revenues are used by regional and national governments to finance local and federal lump-sum 11. A closed rule is a special case, but it allows us to avoid modelling the resolution of differences between the chambers (Ansolabehere et al., 2003) . See, however, Section 5 for a discussion on the implications of our model in the case of conflict between the chambers depending on the different institutional rules generally used by different countries to resolve disagreements. 12. In this sense, the two chambers 'are more like monopolistic producers of complementary goods than like duopolistic producers of a common good' (Diermeier and Myerson, 1999, p. 1184) . 13. See Besley and Coate (1997) and Osborne and Slivinski (1996) . 14. For example, in the US Congress, the House of Representatives approximates population proportional representation, and the Senate adopts unit representation. Such rules imply a tradeoff: More populated regions enjoy a greater retention of local sovereignty under population proportional representation, whereas their requests are moderated under unit representation (Cr emer and Palfrey, 1999). 15. As all residents of a region are assumed to be identical, the representatives coming from the same region are also identical, and the senator of each region is identical to the regional policymaker. This latter feature may approximate the election of members of the Bundesrat in Germany where delegates are members of the government of the L€ ander. Notice, however, that although Germany is considered a country with a bicameral legislation, the Bundesrat is not a proper second chamber of the German Parliament because it is a legislative body that represents the 16 L€ ander at federal level.
transfers to their citizens. The interaction between national and regional units is modelled as a three-stage game. Events unfold as follows. First, at national level, the House chooses the national tax rate, and a federal lump-sum transfer in favour of all citizens of the country. Second, at the local level, each region i, i = 1,. . .,I, chooses both the level of the regional tax, and the amount of a regional lump-sum transfer just in favour of the citizens of the region. Third, agents make their consumption and investment decisions. After the game is played, the Senate has to check whether the national tax rate and the federal lump-sum transfer chosen by the House are also optimal from its viewpoint. If they are (not) optimal, then the Senate will vote in favour of (against) them, and the process ends (does not end), i.e. the bill is (not) promulgated. In other words, our model is as if the House makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer on fiscal policy to the Senate.
16
Both national and regional assemblies adopt majority voting. At the regional level, as all the agents in a region are identical, each regional decision simply reflects the preferences of the residents (Lockwood, 2002) . At the national level, under the assumption that the number of the representatives is odd, the House's decision reflects the preferences of the median representative, who may represent any region, although more probably a large region because of the House's population proportional representation. Instead, the Senate's decision reflects the preferences of the median senator who, de facto, represents the residents of the median region because of unit representation.
17
The model proposed is an adaptation of Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002) and Grazzini and Petretto (2007) for a federal country with bicameral legislature. In a region i = 1,. . .,I, all agents own a fixed initial endowment E i , i = 1,. . .,I, of first period income, i.e. there is an inter-regional heterogeneity in the distribution of the initial endowment.
18 Preferences are described by the following utility function:
where U(Á) is a strictly increasing and concave function, and C 1 i and C 2 i denote consumption in the first and second period respectively. In the first period, each agent decides how much to save and where to save. His/her budget constraint is given by
where k j i denotes individual savings, with the subscript referring to the region i where an agent lives, and the superscript referring to the region j where he/she 16. This is reminiscent of the fast-track authority that exists in US trade policy. US legislators can decide to grant fast-track authority to the President, giving up their power to amend trade agreements. Under fast-track procedures, Congress can only approve or reject trade policy deals that the President makes, with no possibility of amending them. For a study analysing strategic delegation motives behind congressmen's voting behaviour on fast track, see Conconi et al. (2012) . 17. We assume that at stage two of the game, the residents of the region where the House median delegate lives do not know that the House median delegate comes from their region, otherwise they could anticipate that they will be decisive at the House, and thus could strategically adjust the choice on the regional tax rate. The same type of assumption is also made for the Senate (see Grazzini and Petretto, 2012 ). 18. The subscript i is also used to denote an agent living in region i = 1,. . .,I.
chooses to save. Individual savings are given by
. .,I, j 6 ¼ i. In the second period, each agent receives principal and interest on first-period savings, so that the second-period budget constraint for an agent i is given by
where r i denotes the gross remuneration to savings in region i; t i , T denote the regional and the national tax rate respectively; and, finally, g i , G denote the regional and the federal per capita lump-sum transfer respectively.
19
In all regions, the same technology is used to produce the same consumption good. As the technology uses capital as the sole input, in each region, the production function is defined as
. .,I, j 6 ¼ i, denotes total savings in each region, and f is increasing, strictly concave and at least three times continuously differentiable. Because of the assumption that the market is perfectly competitive, firms' profit-maximizing behaviour implies the following familiar condition on marginal factor productivity:
and thus the demand for capital:
Rents arising in region i,
. .,I, are assumed to be fully taxed at the regional level, so that, for each region, the public budget constraint obtains as
and the national budget constraint obtains as
19. See, for example Grazzini and Petretto (2007) and Persson and Tabellini (1992) for the same assumption on savings' taxation financing lump-sum transfers to citizens. This simplified framework corresponds to the case where national and regional public goods are perfect substitutes, and the marginal valuation of public spending is equal to unity. This assumption, however, does not change our qualitative results. See Section 5 for a discussion on this point. 20. Derivatives are denoted by a prime for functions of one argument. 21. We follow Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002) in assuming that rents are taxed at the regional level and no taxation is made at the national level. We also assume that rent taxation is not sufficient to entirely finance lump-sum transfers. Notice, however, that all the results would still hold if rents were not taxed and entered into the utility function as earnings via C 2 i , or if rents were fully taxed at the national level and entered into the utility function as a higher level of the federal lumpsum transfer. For a discussion on the role of the allocation of rents between different tiers of government with respect to production efficiency, see Kotsogiannis and Makris (2002) .
We also assume that there are no intergovernmental transfers, either vertically between the levels of government or horizontally across the regions. 22 In region i, each agent solves his/her optimization problem by maximizing his/her utility function (1) subject to the first-and the second-period budget constraint (2) and (3). It is easy to check that the first-order conditions imply that:
where q denotes the net return to savings. The specification of preferences in (1) simplifies matters by implying that S 0 i ðqÞ [ 0. Because of the presence of savings taxation, q is different from the cost of capital for firms. Furthermore, the assumption of perfect mobility of capital implies that arbitrage by capital investors ensures an identical net return to savings, q, across regions:
where s i = t i + T is the consolidated tax rate. From (9), the individual first-and second-period demand functions obtain as C 1 i ðqÞ and C 2 i ðqÞ, respectively, whereas supply function obtains as S i (q). By assuming full employment of capital, the identical rate of return q is determined by using the market clearing condition:
where CðqÞ P I h¼1 n h S h is total savings, i.e. total supply of capital, with Γ 0 (Á) ⩾ 0. The net rate of return q is the solution to the above equation, and thus it is a function of t i , i = 1,. . .,I and T, i.e. q = q(t 1 ,. . .,t I ,T). Totally differentiating (11) with respect to t i and q yields:
Similarly, by differentiating (11) with respect to T and q yields:
which implies
Accordingly, both an increase in the regional tax rate t i and an increase in the national tax rate T have a negative effect on the net rate of return to capital q.
22. See, for example Boadway and Keen (1996) for an analysis on how intergovernmental transfers can be optimally designed to counteract vertical fiscal externalities.
In region i, i = 1,. . .,I, we also obtain that
The first expressions in (16) and (17) show that an increase in the tax rate of region i leads to an increase in the cost of capital for that region
consequently to a decrease in its demand for capital
Instead, the second expressions in (16) and (17) show which is the effect on the cost of capital and on the demand for capital in region i, when any other region j changes its own tax rate. In particular, an increase in the tax rate of region j leads to a decrease in the cost of capital for region i @r i @t j \ 0 , and accordingly to an increase in region i demand for capital
Finally, the third expressions in (16) and (17) show that an increase in the national tax rate has a positive effect on the regional cost of capital
and thus a negative effect on the regional demand for capital
VOTING ON CAPITAL TAXATION

Regional capital tax rates voted by regional governments
In stage two of the game, each region i, i = 1,. . .,I, has to decide by majority voting on the tax rate to levy on each unit of capital located in its jurisdiction. Such a decision is made by behaving as a Nash player with respect to other regions, i.e. taking as given the other regional tax rates, t j , j = 1,. . .,I, j 6 ¼ i, and as a Stackelberg follower with respect to the national government, i.e. taking as given the level of the national tax rate, T. Regional fiscal choices are thus made without taking into account their effects on the federal government budget constraint. From the solution to the consumer maximization problem in stage three, and from the regional government budget constraint (7) and as all agents in a region are identical, each agent living in region i maximizes his/her indirect utility function:
Federalism with Bicameralism where (7) and (8) have been taken into account, and where, let us recall, q = q (t 1 ,. . .,t I ,T). As
, the first-order condition of (18) with respect to t i obtains as follows:
All the terms in this expression have a familiar interpretation in the literature on fiscal federalism. 24 From (13), the first term describes how an infinitesimal rise in t i negatively affects the net remuneration to individual savings. Although, at equilibrium, all agents bear the same reduction in the net remuneration to savings, each regional government does not take into account the harm caused to citizens of the other regions due to an increase in its own tax rate, thus giving rise to a horizontal externality. The second term is also negative, and it describes how an increase in the regional tax rate, which determines an increase in the cost of capital, leads to a decrease in rent tax revenue, negatively affecting the supply of the regional lump-sum transfer. In terms of a horizontal externality, the government of region i does not take into account the benefits received by the citizens of the other regions when capital invested within their borders increases, and also rent tax revenue increases because of an increase in t i . The third term represents the sum of the direct and the indirect effect of a tax increase on regional tax revenue. As usual, in the case of a positive tax, the direct effect is positive while the indirect effect is negative. As region i, when increasing its tax rate, does not take into account the capital flight which benefits other regions (a positive horizontal externality), it perceives the above indirect effect in a negative way, i.e. as a deadweight loss, creating disincentives to redistribution. Finally, the fourth term describes a vertical externality from the regional to the national level, i.e. how an infinitesimal rise in t i affects the national tax revenue via a change in the national tax base (a tax base effect). This term, however, should be sufficiently negligible due to the denominator, i.e. the total population of the federation.
Condition (19) defines region i's reaction function: 
so that the tax rate chosen in region i depends on the tax rate chosen by all other regions, t Ài , and the federal tax rate, T. A Nash equilibrium of the game played by the regions is given by the solution to the system of the above reaction functions. In what follows, we will denote t *i (t À*i ,T) as the equilibrium capital tax rate of region i , i = 1,. . .,I, at the second stage of the game.
The national capital tax rate voted by the House
In stage one of the game, the House votes on the national tax rate T. As the House's choice on T automatically determines the level of the federal lump-sum transfer G, the policy problem faced by the House is one-dimensional, so that we
23. An application of the envelope theorem is behind (19) and the following first-order conditions (23) and (30). 24. See, for example Grazzini and Petretto (2007). can apply the median voter theorem. 25 Let us define i = m as the median representative. The House then chooses the tax rate T to maximize the welfare of the median representative. As he/she acts as a national legislator, his/her optimization problem is subject both to the federal public budget constraint and the public budget constraint of his/her region, and thus his/her objective function obtains as
where let us recall that regional reaction functions are given in (20), and thus the net remuneration of capital q is now given by
so that the House objective function differs with respect to that of a regional government (18). The first-order condition of (21) with respect to T is given by
where
and
Let us now comment on both a and Ψ iH . First, notice that a describes the effect of an infinitesimal increase in T on the net remuneration to savings in (22) both directly, i.e. @q @T , and indirectly via the change in the regional tax rates, i.e. 
(i) If
25. In what follows, we suppose that agents' preferences are single peaked on the whole range of the national tax rate.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In what follows, we restrict our attention to the economically meaningful cases (i) and (ii) when an infinitesimal change in the national tax rate negatively affects the net remuneration to savings, i.e. a < 0. This corresponds to the case where national and local tax rates are either strategic complements or they are strategic substitutes, but the direct effect of the national tax rate on the net remuneration of savings is greater than the indirect one. 26 Second, Ψ iH in (25) describes the effect of a change in T on the regional demand for capital. It can be either positive or negative depending on the sign of the term in brackets, namely the effect of the national tax rate T on the gross remuneration to savings:
@T with q given in (22) . In what follows, it seems to us to be economically reasonable to assume that an increase in the national tax rate T has a positive effect on the cost of capital, i.e.
We are now in a position to discuss the terms in (23), which again have a familiar interpretation. The first two terms are analogous to the first two terms in (19) except that they are expressed with respect to an infinitesimal variation in the national tax rate T instead of in the regional tax rate t i . The third term describes a vertical externality, and it is given by the sum of the direct and the indirect effects on regional tax revenue of an increase in the national tax rate. The direct effect is positive (negative) when national and regional tax rates are strategic complements (substitutes), i.e. a revenue effect. 28 The indirect effect is
e. a tax-base effect. Finally, the fourth term describes the sum of the direct and the indirect effects on national tax revenue of an increase in the national tax rate. The direct effect is always positive, whereas the indirect effect is negative because a þ 1 þ @t i @T [ 0. As it will be useful below, let us define Ω H as the sum of the indirect effects on regional and national tax revenue of an increase in the national tax rate from the viewpoint of the House:
By solving (23), the equilibrium value of the national tax rate from the viewpoint of the House, T H , obtains as follows
26. Both the theoretical and the empirical literatures on fiscal federalism have analysed whether national and local tax rates should be considered strategic substitutes or complements. For theoretical articles, see, for example Kotsogiannis (2002, 2003) and Kelders and K€ othenb€ urger (2010) . The empirical results are mixed. For an empirical investigation on business taxation, see, for example Hayashi and Boadway (2001) which shows that, for the case of Canada, provincial tax rates respond negatively to the federal tax rate. 27. In a symmetric set-up, and under plausible assumptions, Grazzini and Petretto (2007) show that a þ 1 þ @t i @T [ 0. 28. See, for example Goodspeed (2000) .
AGREEMENT OR DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO CHAMBERS?
The national capital tax rate voted by the Senate
After the game is played, we check whether the national tax rate chosen by the House is also optimal from the viewpoint of the Senate. To investigate this point, consider the Senate objective function evaluated at the equilibrium of the game. Let us define i = M as the median senator. From the viewpoint of the Senate, the national tax rate is inefficiently high (low), at equilibrium, i.e. there would be overtaxation (undertaxation), when
The Senate, instead, would vote in favour of the national tax rate chosen by the House when
As the Senate decision reflects the preferences of the median senator, we assume that the Senate evaluates the choice of the national tax rate made by the House by taking into account both the public budget constraint of the region from which the median senator comes and the federal public budget constraint. Thus, the median senator objective function obtains as
noticing that the net remuneration of capital q is now given by
from the solution to the House's maximization problem at stage one of the game. Accordingly, the first-order condition with respect to T is given by
As a, b also describes the direct and the indirect effects of an infinitesimal increase in T on the net remuneration to savings, but contrary to a, now b takes into account the net remuneration to savings resulting at the end of the game, and given in (29). The sign of b and its value with respect to a are provided in the following:
Proof. See the Appendix.
As for a, we restrict our attention, in what follows, to the economically meaningful cases (i) and (ii) when an infinitesimal change in the national tax rate negatively affects the net remuneration to savings, i.e. b < 0. Furthermore, like Ψ iH , Ψ iS also describes the effect of a change in T on the regional demand for capital. For the same reasons discussed above, we only consider the case when an increase in the national tax rate T has a positive effect on the gross remuneration to savings, i.e.
Each term in (30) can be given a simple interpretation equivalent to the ones already provided for the House with the only difference being that now the viewpoint is that of the Senate, and the net remuneration of capital is (29). As it will be useful below, let us define Ω S as the sum of the indirect effects on regional and national tax revenue of an increase in the national tax rate still from the viewpoint of the Senate:
We are now in a position to analyse whether the national tax rate chosen by the House is also optimal from the Senate viewpoint. To provide a clear-cut intuition of our results, we will keep the presentation as simple as possible, by assuming that the difference between the viewpoints of the House and the Senate is negligible with regard to the sum of the indirect effects of the national tax rate on regional and national tax revenue, i.e. Ω H À Ω S = 0. 29 In what follows, first, we analyse the general case where the House and the Senate median voters are different, and then the particular case where they coincide. Furthermore, even if we think that the set-up when one chamber votes after the other is the most suitable to describe the real world, we also present the set-up when the two chambers vote simultaneously for two reasons. First, when the median voters of the two chambers are different, the conditions to obtain the result of undertaxation/overtaxation are the same for both the set-up with sequential and simultaneous voting, i.e. the result does not depend on the sequence of voting (Section 4.2). On the contrary, when the median voters of the two chambers coincide, the result of undertaxation/overtaxation arises with a sequential voting while an agreement is reached with a simultaneous voting, i.e. the result depends on whether there is a sequential or a simultaneous voting (Section 4.3). The second 29. Our qualitative results would not change without such an assumption, but the intuition behind our propositions would be less clear-cut.
reason why we present the set-up with simultaneity in voting is that it allows us to discuss the implications of our model in the case of disagreement between chambers, depending on the different institutional rules which could be used to resolve such a conflict (Section 5).
House and Senate with different median voters
To concentrate our attention on the set-up that can be interpreted most straightforwardly, we consider the case with two regions m and M, where one is a capital importer and the other one a capital exporter, i.e. 
This result depends on whether the regions where the median voters of the Senate and the House live are capital exporters or importers, and on the extent of fiscal competition between regions which drives the allocation of total savings in each region. In particular, the result depends on the interplay between two effects. A first vertical effect describes how the median representative and the median senator choose the national tax rate in reaction to the regional tax rates: If the regional tax rate is chosen at an inefficiently low (high) level, then the national legislator would counteract this by voting for a high (low) national tax rate.
31 A second horizontal effect describes how the choice of the national tax rate depends on the amount of per-capita capital invested in region m where the median representative lives, and in region M where the median senator lives. This is because the national tax rate preferred by the House and the Senate reflects the preferences of the median representative and the median senator, respectively, and such preferences are affected by the amount of capital invested within their own region of residence.
To grasp the intuition behind the result in Proposition 1, consider, for example the case when, at equilibrium, region m (M) is a capital exporter (importer), i.e. S m ðqÞ À . As region m (M) is a capital exporter (importer), then t m (t M ) is fixed at an inefficiently high (low) level by the local government. At a national level, this tends to be counteracted by the vertical effect, namely 30. The result also holds when the two regions are both capital importers or capital exporters. The effects determining the result are also of the same type as the ones described in the text, which is why we have chosen only to present the simpler set-up. 31. We provide the intuition of our results for the case when national and local tax rates are strategic complements, i.e. the median representative m would tend to choose a low national tax rate T, whereas the median senator M would prefer a high national tax rate. However, the national tax rate also depends on a horizontal effect. As the per-capita capital investment in region m is higher than that in region M, the median representative m would tend to choose a higher national tax rate than the one preferred by the median senator M. Overall, the result on undertaxation from the viewpoint of the Senate occurs when the vertical effect offsets the horizontal one: The median representative m chooses a national tax rate T which is inefficiently low from the viewpoint of the median senator M who would, instead, prefer a higher national tax rate. Mutatis mutandis, the same kind of reasoning applies to obtain, instead, overtaxation from the Senate viewpoint.
Finally, notice that the Senate will agree on the national capital tax rate chosen by the House if and only if the vertical and the horizontal effects described above offset each other perfectly so that
We now show that our result does not depend on the sequence of the game, i.e. the fact that the Senate votes on the national tax rate after the House has voted on it. Should the Senate and the House vote simultaneously on a national tax rate, both of them would solve their respective maximization problem, taking into account the net remuneration of capital given in (22), and accordingly a as the effect of an infinitesimal increase in T on the net remuneration to savings (see (24)). In this case, we can state the following: When the median legislators of the two chambers are different, even if they vote simultaneously and thus both of them take into account a, they still disagree on the choice of a national capital tax rate unless the vertical and the horizontal effects offset each other perfectly. Indeed, as regions m and M are one capital importer and the other one capital exporter, and the amount of per-capita capital invested within their borders is different, there is a conflict of interests between them. The result of undertaxation or overtaxation then follows because of the interplay between the same vertical and horizontal effects underlying Proposition 1 (the conditions of Corollary 1 are the same as those of Proposition 1). Proof. See the Appendix.
Thus, even if the two chambers share the same median voter, they still disagree on the choice of a national capital tax rate when regions M and m are capital importers or exporters. They agree only in the very special case when regions M and m are neither capital importers nor exporters.
In particular, when the median voters of the two chambers coincide, the horizontal effect described above does not occur anymore because
. There is only the vertical effect which depends on the fact that the regions where the median representative and the median senator live are capital importers or capital exporters. Let us suppose that they are capital importers, i.e.
In both regions M and m, regional capital tax rates will then be chosen at an inefficiently low level. To counteract this, both the median representative and the median senator would like a high national capital tax rate. However, the national capital tax rate T H chosen by the median representative will still not be sufficiently high from the viewpoint of the median senator because the extent of the vertical effect realized by the Senate is higher than that realized by the House, i.e. b S M ðqÞ À
by Lemma 2. Notice that this result of undertaxation/overtaxation crucially depends on the sequentiality of the game, i.e. on the fact that the Senate realizes a higher depressive effect on the net remuneration of capital of an increase in the national tax rate than the House, i.e. |b| > |a|. Contrary to the previous case with different median voters in the two chambers where the conditions to obtain undertaxation/overtaxation are the same for both the set-up with sequential and simultaneous voting, when the Senate and the House share the same median legislator, the result changes depending on the timing of the legislative decision making. Indeed, should the Senate and the House vote simultaneously, both of them would choose their preferred national capital tax rate by taking into account a in (24), and thus not only the horizontal but also the vertical effect would no longer take place, so that both chambers would agree on the same national capital tax rate. This result is summarized as follows:
Corollary 2 When the Senate and the House share an identical median voter, and the Senate and the House simultaneously vote on a national capital tax rate, the Senate agrees on the national tax rate chosen by the House.
Federalism with Bicameralism
When the median representative coincides with the median senator, and the House and the Senate vote simultaneously, then both chambers are identical in all respects, and thus they will agree on the same national capital tax rate. This result coincides with the one that we would obtain in a unicameral system where the median voter of the only chamber coincides with m = M.
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
Our results show the conditions under which the two chambers disagree on the choice of a national fiscal policy. When the Senate and the House have different median voters, these conditions depend on the interplay between a vertical and a horizontal effect, and do not depend on the sequential nature of our model, i.e. the fact that the Senate votes after the House (Proposition 1 and Corollary 1). The vertical effect describes how the median representative and the median senator choose the national tax rate in reaction to the regional tax rates, whereas the horizontal effect describes how the choice of the national tax rate depends on the way capital investments move from one region to the others, i.e. on the amount of per-capita capital invested in the regions where the median representative and the median senator live. Instead, with a Senate and a House which share the same median legislator, no horizontal effect takes place, and the vertical effect occurs only when the Senate votes after the House. In such a case, a disagreement between the chambers arises, unless a very special case occurs when the region of residence of both the median representative and the median senator is neither a capital importer nor exporter (Proposition 2). Contrary to the case where the Senate and the House have different median voters, now the sequentiality in voting by the two chambers is crucial to obtain the result of disagreement. Indeed, when the two chambers vote simultaneously, there is neither a vertical nor a horizontal effect, so that the Senate and the House will agree on the same capital tax rate (Corollary 2). Even if we think that the most appropriate scenario to describe the real world is the one with a sequential decision making rather than the one with a simultaneous decision making, the description that we have made of the latter will also be useful in the following discussion.
Our results have been obtained in a simplified set-up, and in what follows we discuss, first, our assumption on lump-sum transfers, and second, the implications of our model in the case of conflict between chambers according to different possible institutional rules which could be used to resolve disagreements.
First, we have supposed that regional and national capital taxes finance regional and national lump-sum transfers respectively. It can easily be checked that substituting regional and national lump-sum transfers with regional and national public goods, respectively, does not change our qualitative results. 32 Of course,
32. In such a case, consumers' preferences can be described by the following utility function:
. . .; I; where g i and G denote a local public good provided by each regional government i, without spill-over effects, and a federal public good provided by the national government respectively. the results would now depend not only on the interplay between the vertical and the horizontal effect but also on different preferences for local and national public goods in regions M and m. So, for example in the case when the interplay between the vertical and the horizontal effects leads to the median senator preferring a higher national capital tax rate than the median representative, this result will be reinforced (mitigated) when the median senator has a greater (lower) preference for the local public good than the median representative. Second, our model does not analyse how a disagreement between chambers can be resolved because the methods of reaching an agreement vary greatly between different countries, and even within the same country, between financial and non-financial legislation. However, we can try to predict the outcome of our model depending on which method is used to resolve disagreements between chambers. In general, possible methods to resolve conflicts between chambers are as follows: the navette, the conference committee, the joint session, the ultimate decision by one chamber and new elections (Tsebelis and Money, 1997) .
The most common method is the so-called navette, or shuttle system. After a bill is passed in the first chamber, it is sent to the second chamber. If the second chamber does not agree in whole or in part with the first chamber, it amends the bill and sends it back to the first chamber. Thus, the bill shuttles back and forth between chambers until an agreement is reached. The number of times a bill can shuttle between the two chambers varies according to the country. In Italy, for example, there is no upper limit, and the introduction of such a limit is currently one of the most debated constitutional reforms in the political arena to fasten legislation approval.
Let us consider the result in our model depending on whether or not the median legislators in the two chambers are different. In the first case, when the Senate disagrees with the national capital tax rate chosen by the House, it sends an amended bill to the House with its preferred national capital tax rate. When the House votes on this amended bill, it will no longer take into account the effect of T on the net remuneration of capital given by a in (24), but could consider b in (31) like the Senate. We would then have the case covered by Corollary 1. Thus, there would still be disagreement between the House and the Senate depending on the interplay between the vertical and the horizontal effects, unless of course such effects perfectly offset each other. Thus, the bill would return to the Senate, and the process would never end. 33 On the contrary, in the second case with chambers sharing the same median legislator, if the House votes at the second round, taking into account b instead of a, then the case covered by Corollary 2 would arise so that an agreement would be always achieved. 34 However, should the two chambers not share the same median legislator, and should the navette fail, there may be several alternative methods of reaching a final decision. One method is a conference committee: Each chamber usually appoints delegates who are asked to reach a compromise. 35 In most cases, the 33. The same type of result would also arise if the House, instead of using b like the Senate, uploads a new value for the effect of T on the net remuneration of capital. 34. If the House, instead, uploads a new value for the effect of T on the net remuneration of capital, it will vote against the amended bill, and the process would never end unless
. This is the case, for example, in France, Switzerland and the US. two chambers appoint the conference committee to reach a compromise, while fixing the rules to choose the conference committee members and the set of admissible solutions. The conference committee usually acts as a unicameral small chamber under majority voting rule, and then the compromise reached is proposed to both chambers under closed rule (without amendments). If such a method was adopted in our model, then the median voter of the conference committee would be decisive. This voter could come from each region of the federal country, although we could expect bargaining between the House and the Senate on the rules to select delegates to send the median representative and the median senator to the conference committee.
Another method is a joint session: Both chambers meet in a common session to vote on the bill. 36 This solution usually favours the lower chamber which in most cases has a larger number of legislators than the upper chamber. If such a method was implemented in our model, then the preferred national capital tax rate would be the one preferred by the median voter of the common session.
Finally, in some cases, one chamber is decisive, 37 and so in our model, either the median legislator or the median senator would be decisive. Of course, another possibility is new elections.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this study, we have analysed how bicameralism can affect national fiscal policy in a federal country where both vertical and horizontal externalities play a role. In particular, our simple model attempts to take into account the sequential structure of the legislative process in a bicameral institutional setting where the two chambers can be considered as 'competitive organizations in a market for legislation' (Diermeier and Myerson (1999, p. 1184) . In the case of egalitarian bicameralism, for financial legislation at least, national fiscal policy is voted in a chamber (the House, in our model) and may not be amended by the other chamber (the Senate). The negative power to block legislation of the Senate makes it very difficult for the two chambers to reach an agreement on national fiscal policy. In this sense, our result confirms that with bicameralism changes to the status quo are more difficult to reach than with unicameralism, even when the two chambers are politically similar, i.e. they share the same pivotal voter (Tsebelis and Money, 1997) . Alternatively, bicameral legislatures where chambers have different assignments can make changes to the status quo easier to reach.
Finally, although we have checked that the same type of qualitative results can be obtained in an institutional framework where the regional governments and the national government play a Nash game instead of a Stackelberg one, we stress the fact that our results have been obtained in a particular model of strategic interaction between the two chambers. We think, however, that to try to shed some light on the mechanisms behind the choice of fiscal policies in federal 36 . See, for example Australia and India. 37. Examples of countries where the lower chamber is decisive are Austria, France, Ireland and the UK. In some countries, which chamber is decisive depends on where the bill is introduced: Either the initiating chamber or the reviewing chamber can be decisive.
countries, we need to take into account the institutional bicameral nature of such countries. This could help in understanding the consequences on national fiscal policies of separating legislators into two chambers which represent the same voters but follow different electoral rules. Our simple model can thus be considered as a first step. Extensions to broader set-ups which include, for example, strategic voting, the modelling of the game after a Senate's veto, and/or the veto costs of a disagreement are open fields for further research. Proof of Lemma 2. The sign of b in (31) directly follows from (13) and (15). By comparing (24) and (31), it is easy to check that it is always a > b.
Proof of Proposition 1. Using (25) and (26) 
